




HPAI H5(N8) in Member States in poultry, captive and wild birds

(01/10/2016-14/02/2017)

DG Health and Food Safety



HPAI H5N8 in wild birds, captive birds and in poultry 2016-2017




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NORTH
AMERICA

EUROPE

Broad
migration
flows of
ducks
across
Europe



NORTH
AMERICA

**Integration:
key migratory
corridors for
waterbirds in
Europe**

**Mixing with
indigenous
species!**

E

Norwegian
Sea


North
Sea

Caspian
Sea


Black Sea

Mediterranean Sea

AFRICA



Phylogeny of the HA gene of H5N8 HPAI



Member State	Wild birds	Poultry	Captive birds	Total
Germany	318	55	12	385
France	24	244	1	269
Italy	4	4		8
The Netherlands	43	9	6	58
Belgium			1	1
The United Kingdom	19	8		27
Ireland	8			8
Denmark	40	1	1	42
Greece	6	3		9
Spain	1			1
Portugal	1			1
Austria	30	2		32
Finland	13		1	14
Sweden	20	3	2	25
The Czech Republic	30	27		57
Hungary	40	231	5	276
Poland	49	49		98
Slovenia	16			16
Bulgaria	11	63	2	76
Romania	36	8	1	45
Slovakia	43	6	2	51
Croatia	10	2		12
Total	762	715	34	1511


Number of HPAI H5(N8) outbreaks by Member State

01/10/2016 to
14/02/2017



European
Commission

Number of HPAI H5(N8) outbreaks by Member State as from 01/10/2016 to 14/02/2017






European
Commission


Number of HPAI H5(N8) outbreaks in poultry by Member State (01/10/2016 to 14/02/2017)

Member State	Primary	Secondary	Rate 2nd/1st
Germany	47	8	0.17
France	218	26	0.12
Italy	4		0
The Netherlands	9		0
The United Kingdom	6	2	0.33
Denmark	1		0
Greece	3		0
Austria	2		0
Sweden	3		0
The Czech Republic	27		0
Hungary	38	193	5.08
Poland	46	3	0.07
Bulgaria	15	48	3.20
Romania	7	1	0.14
Slovakia	6		0
Croatia	2		0
Total	434	281	0.65


Epidemic weekly curve of HPAI H5(N8) in poultry



Epidemic weekly curve of HPAI H5N8 in wild birds




Comparison "2005/2006 H5N1" with "2016-2017 H5N(8)" epidemics



Comparison "2005/2006 H5N1" with "2016-2017 H5N8" epidemics

Nr of susceptible birds



Species	Number of events*	%	High Risk Species not detected positive to ate in the current epizootic
Duck spp	85	19%	Black-necked Grebe (<i>Podiceps nigricollis</i>)
Tufted duck (<i>Aythya fuligula</i>)	68	15%	Bewick's Swan (<i>Cygnus columbianus</i>)
Unspecified	58	13%	Bean Goose (<i>Anser fabalis</i>)
Gulls spp	41	9%	Pink-footed Goose (<i>Anser brachyrhynchus</i>)
Swan spp	41	9%	Greater White-fronted Goose (<i>Anser albifrons albifrons</i>)
Mute swan (<i>Cygnus olor</i>)	38	8%	Canada Goose (<i>Branta Canadensis</i>)
Herring gull (<i>Larus argentatus</i>)	23	5%	Barnacle Goose (<i>Branta leucopsis</i>)
Goose spp.	21	5%	Brent Goose (<i>Branta bernicla</i>)
Eurasian wigeon (<i>Anas penelope</i>)	18	4%	Red-breasted Goose (<i>Branta ruficollis</i>)
Black-headed gull (<i>Chroicocephalus ridibundus</i>)	14	3%	Gadwall (<i>Anas strepera</i>)
Great black-backed gull (<i>Larus marinus</i>)	11	2%	Northern Pintail (<i>Anas acuta</i>)
Great crested grebe (<i>Podiceps cristatus</i>)	10	2%	Garganey (<i>Anas querquedula</i>)
White-tailed eagle (<i>Haliaeetus albicilla</i>)	10	2%	Northern Shoveler (<i>Anas clypeata</i>)
Whooper swan (<i>Cygnus cygnus</i>)	7	2%	Marbled Teal (<i>Marmaronetta angustirostris</i>)
Common buzzard (<i>Buteo buteo</i>)	7	1%	Smew (<i>Mergus albellus</i>)
Common pochard (<i>Aythya farina</i>)	6	1%	Black Kite (<i>Milvus migrans</i>)
Mallard (<i>Anas platyrhynchos</i>)	6	1%	Red Kite (<i>Milvus milvus</i>)
Heron spp.	5	1%	Eurasian Marsh Harrier (<i>Circus aeruginosus</i>)
Common coot (<i>Fulica atra</i>)	4	1%	Rough-legged Buzzard (<i>Buteo lagopus</i>)
Little grebe (<i>Tachybaptus ruficollis</i>)	4	1%	Common Kestrel (<i>Falco tinnunculus</i>)
White stork (<i>Ciconia ciconia</i>)	4	<1%	Purple Swampphen (<i>Porphyrio porphyrio</i>)
Common magpie (<i>Pica pica</i>)	3	1%	Eurasian Golden Plover (<i>Pluvialis apricaria</i>)
Peregrine falcon (<i>Falco peregrinus</i>)	3	1%	Northern Lapwing (<i>Vanellus vanellus</i>)
Eurasian teal (<i>Anas crecca</i>)	2	<1%	Ruff (<i>Philomachus pugnax</i>)
Common gull (<i>Larus canus</i>)	2	1%	Black-tailed Godwit (<i>Limosa limosa</i>)
Red-crested pochard (<i>Netta rufina</i>)	2	<1%	
Buzzard spp	2	<1%	
Emu (<i>Dromaius novaehollandiae</i>)	2	<1%	
Hooded crow (<i>Corvus cornix</i>)	2	<1%	
Great cormorant (<i>Phalacrocorax carbo</i>)	1	<1%	
Lesser white-fronted goose (<i>Anser erythropus</i>)	2	<1%	
Greylag goose (<i>Anser anser</i>)	1	<1%	
Shelduck (<i>Tadorna tadorna</i>)	1	<1%	
Grey heron (<i>Ardea cinerea</i>)	1	<1%	
Common moorhen (<i>Gallinula chloropus</i>)	1	<1%	
Lesser black-backed gull (<i>Larus fuscus</i>)	1	<1%	
Common goldeneye (<i>Bucephala clangula</i>)	1	<1%	
Common eider (<i>Somateria mollissima</i>)	1	<1%	
Eagle (spp. unspecified)	1	<1%	
Green sandpiper (<i>Tringa ochropus</i>)	1	<1%	
Common tern (<i>Sterna hirundo</i>)	1	<1%	
Carrion crow (<i>Corvus corone</i>)	1	<1%	
Common raven	1	<1%	
Curlew (<i>Numenius spp.</i>)	1	<1%	
Wigeon spp.	1	<1%	
Eurasian Eagle-Owl (<i>Bubo bubo</i>)	1	<1%	
Eurasian Sparrowhawk (<i>Accipiter nisus</i>)	1	<1%	
Eurasian white fronted goose (<i>Anser albifrons</i>)	1	<1%	
Owl spp.	1	<1%	
Northern hawk (<i>Surnia ulula</i>)	1	<1%	

*Note: Several events involved different species
Those in bold are on the list of higher risk species

¹ Rounded down

Wild bird species reported infected with H5N8(N5) since October 2016 to Mid-January 2017

Legislation (1)



Commission Implementing Decision on risk mitigating and reinforced biosecurity measures and early detection systems in relation to risks posed by wild birds for the transmission of HPAI viruses to poultry
(voted on 24/01 at PAFF, adopted 14/02)

Need to address virus introduction into poultry flocks through direct and indirect contacts with wild birds

Member States have to **identify "high risk areas"** and holdings at increased risk for HPAI infection based on the:

- Outbreak situation in poultry and wild birds on their territory, nearby Member States or third countries
- Risk factors for **virus introduction**: location of holdings close to water bodies where wild birds gather during migration, open air holdings
- Risk factors for **virus spread**: density and type of holdings, intensity of movements of poultry, persons, vehicles and trade patterns
- Risk assessments by EFSA or national and international bodies

Legislation (2)



In "high risk areas" it is prohibited to:

- keep poultry in the open air
- use water from open surfaces
- provide feed that was stored unprotected from birds or other animals
- gather poultry or captive birds at markets, shows and exhibitions
- use decoy birds of the orders Anseriformes and Charadriiformes for hunting

Derogations are possible provided Member States can ensure that all measures are taken to prevent virus spread, e.g. protect poultry with nets or roofs from contacts with wild birds, feeding and watering inside

Legislation (3)



- Member States must introduce or reinforce early detection systems aimed at rapid reporting by the owners to the competent authority of:
 - drop in feed and water intake and in egg production
 - any sign of avian influenza in poultry holdings
 - an observed mortality rate and any clinical sign or post-mortem lesion suggesting HPAI virus presence
- variation of these parameters in different poultry species and production types as well as by the virus characteristics must be taken into account
- Wild bird surveillance according to the guidelines laid down in Decision 2010/367/EU must be enhanced
- Sectors are very diverse - detailed descriptions on biosecurity or thresholds for early detection should be avoided in legislation
- Applicable until 30/06/2018 - to be reviewed in the light of EFSA's scientific opinion on AI available in 09/2017

EFSA's work on avian influenza

EFSA is working on an exhaustive mandate following the 2014/15 HPAI epidemic **assessing the risk for HPAI H5(N8) introduction into EU poultry** and suitability of EU legislation on biosecurity, surveillance in wild birds and poultry and zoning

Scope was enlarged to deal with **mutation from low pathogenic avian influenza to HPAI viruses** and the differences in the epidemiology

In 12/2016 EFSA issued a statement on the current epidemic anticipating certain replies to the mandate

Data collection from current outbreaks will start shortly

EU Veterinary Emergency Team (CVET)

Expert missions to:

- Hungary 19-21 December 2016
- Bulgaria 16-19 January 2017



Legislation on Regionalisation

- First Decision in relation to HPAI H5N8 in Hungary published on 10/11/2016.
- Decisions shall ensure transparency and safe trade between disease free areas of Member States and to third countries.
- The establishing of the areas under restrictions aims at preventing any unnecessary disturbance to trade within the Union and to avoid unjustified barriers to trade being imposed by third countries.
- Due to the further evolution, seven further decisions for specific affected Member States
- Consolidated Decision (EU) 2016/2122 - amended six times since
- A new consolidated Decision was published on 11/02.
- It will refer to **HPAI**, as **HPAI H5N5** detections in wild birds (NL, HR, SI, PL, EL) and in Germany in poultry.

HPAI H5N8 situation in third countries

- **Ukraine:** Regionalisation approved by Com.Impl. Reg. 2017/193 for Ukraine, maybe reduce size of the regionalisation
- **Russia:** 5 regions affected, further information requested
- **Israel:** imports suspended, no request for regionalisation
- **former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia:** suspension of egg and poultry meat imports, anyway no approved establishments
- **Serbia:** only heat treated poultry meat products
- **Bosnia–Herzegovina:** no imports
- **Montenegro:** only wild birds positive: HP H5N5
- **USA:** only wild birds Montana HP H5N2

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON MATERIAL TRANSFER

МЕМОРАНДУМ О ВЗАИМОПОНИМАНИИ ОТНОСИТЕЛЬНО ОБМЕНА МАТЕРИАЛАМИ

THIS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING is made this 19th day of September by and between, The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs of Nobel House, 17 Smith Square, London SW1P 3JR ("the Secretary of State") acting through the Animal and Plant Health Agency - APHA (EU Reference laboratory for avian influenza and Newcastle disease [EURL]), Addlestone, Surrey, United Kingdom (hereinafter called "the Provider" or "the Recipient") and The Russian Federal State-Financed Governmental Institution "Federal Centre for Animal Health" - FGBI ARRIAH (Reference laboratory for avian influenza and Newcastle disease of the Russian Federation), 600901 Yur'evets, Vladimir, Russia (hereinafter called "the Provider" or "the Recipient").

Exchange of HPAI and ND virus isolates
from initial and significant epidemiological events in
poultry farms between the EURL and the Russian NRL.
Dispatch handled by the EURL.

More information:

http://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/animal-diseases/control-measures/avian-influenza_en

Thank you for the attention!